

Evolving Strategy: South-South Coalition in the GATT/WTO

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This research offers a concise retrospect on the South-South Coalition Strategy within multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT/WTO framework. The SSC strategy evolved in the postwar era, when the South integrated itself to demand for a New International Economic Order featured by fairness of outcome in international economic rules and activities. It then encountered an opponent trend of neo-liberalism, through which the South practically decided to sectoral exchange of economic interests with the North. From the new millennium onward, the South is learning to adopt a more issue-specific SSC strategy in trade negotiations. Although a question is arising for the future of SSC because of some emerging nations rising out from the traditional South group, a timely reflection from an evolutionary perspective would facilitate the understanding of the SSC strategy for weak countries to establish a fairer international economic order.

Keywords: South-South Coalition, GATT, WTO, Trade Negotiation, Neo-liberalism, The North, The South

1. Introduction

Despite the Cold War and continuing regional conflicts, the international community has been enjoying a peaceful economic growth overall in the postwar period. In the course of the global economic boom, there were two salient features: one is the constant enhancement of international trade exchanges, the other, the deepening

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interdependence among economies. Such a modern trend may be defined as ‘globalization,’ institutionally supported by the international economic rule.¹ Globalization would accelerate the coordination and cooperation among nations.

In the international trade of goods, services and intellectual property, the rule-making and rule-reforming process has always been fierce. A global trade regime was first designed just after World War II with the International Trade Organization (“ITO”). Due to the divergence between the US and European powers,² as well as the collective demand for “Trade and Development” ushered in by developing countries in the later stage of negotiations,³ the US was not satisfied with the final compromise and the grand plan was thus aborted. Luckily though, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was passed at the second preparatory meeting in April 1947. The GATT had been working as a ‘provisional measure’ until it was replaced in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).

Since 1947, the contracting parties/member States have conducted a total of nine rounds of multilateral trade negotiations: the first eight rounds were under the GATT framework and the latest round is under the WTO framework (Appendix I). These rounds of negotiations have resulted in dramatic reduction of tariffs and restrictions on non-tariff measures, facilitating to a very large extent, the liberalization of international trade and the increase of economic welfare in general. In these negotiations, despite prioritizing the freedom and the fairness of the process,⁴ the interests of developing countries were not fully considered.⁵

It is generally recognized that global wealth has not been fairly distributed, mainly because the ‘game rules’ governing international economic exchange have been firmly controlled by western powers. Accordingly, several developing countries are supporting the South-South Coalition (“SSC”) as a responding strategy, which can help mobilize and conglomerate their collective strength to establish a New International Economic Order (“NIEO”).⁶ The best strategy for developing countries is to participate in the rule-making and rule-reforming process of the world economy.⁷

As the Doha Development Round negotiations are now at a stalemate again, the following questions may arise regarding the negotiating patterns of developing countries under the GATT/WTO framework:

1. What have they done for the rule-making of international economy?;
2. To what extent have they executed the SSC strategy?;
3. What are the main difficulties for adopting such strategy?; and
4. How is the SSC strategy evolving?

The primary purpose of this study is to answer these questions. For this research goal, the author will divide the total nine rounds of multilateral trade negotiations into three different phases from the perspective of the South. The first phase is the ratification of the GATT (1947) to the eve of Uruguay Round (1986). The second phase is from the Uruguay Round to the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the WTO (1999). The third and final phase is from the beginning of the new millennium up until today.⁸

This paper will examine the following topics of each phase, respectively: (a) Background: the international environment affecting the SSC strategy in general; (b) Agent: the main coordinating platform, group and leading countries for the coalition of the South; (c) Goal: the core appeal of the South; (d) Method: the main negotiating tactics of the South; and (e) Achievements: the results of the SSC rule-reforming.

2. Phase I (1947 – 1986): SSC for the Fair Outcome

Phase I started in 1947. At that time, most European powers were committed to post-war reconstruction, while the US was rising as a superpower. Accordingly, the first five rounds of GATT multilateral trade negotiations were solely steered by the Americans, who had no rival in bargaining. In order to build a strategic alliance against the socialistic camp headed by the then Soviet Union, the US took an extremely dominant stance towards Western Europe and Japan.⁹ Entering the early 1970s when the European economy had just recovered, however, Western European countries gradually began to exhibit their preferences in the multilateral trade rule-making process.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the US and most European powers shared some common interests so that their stances could be easily coordinated. At the Tokyo Round, Alonzo L. McDonald, the then US negotiating representative, addressed:

It became evident that [then EU representative] Denman and I must first of all make a deal before there was any hope for anything but chaos in general meetings of the Multinational Group at GATT... Denman and I concluded that after we had come to a deal, we should then include the Japanese and afterward move through other industrial nations to gain agreement on a rather informal basis... The GATT was hardly involved as the Tokyo Round proceeded toward its intensive final stages.¹¹

On the contrary, most third world countries were not interested in the enactment of GATT rules *per se*. Some scholars even claimed that role of developing countries was no more than that of an ‘observer’ or ‘free rider’. They just hoped to share the reduction of tariffs that the developed countries had reached, through the MFN principle.¹²

During that period, international trade was fully dominated by the North. The *de facto* negotiating procedures (mainly the Green Room Meeting and Principal Supplier Principle) prescribed that the initial negotiation took place among the principal producers and the largest consumers.¹³ As a result, most of developing countries were ruled out of the initial decision-making process.¹⁴

In 1964, developing countries began to join the newly established United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), which was undertaking a competitive role to the GATT. The UNCTAD was designed to actively safeguard the interests of developing countries and promote the just course of establishing the NIEO. At the same time, the G77 was formed as a platform for coordination and coalition of the South. With these new platforms, developing countries had won a few bargaining chips in the GATT regime including the most extreme possibility of leaving the GATT.

In this atmosphere, developing countries carried out the SSC strategy in a rather simplified manner, by directly demanding for “fairness of the outcome” mainly through the Special & Differential Treatments (“SDT”) mechanism, rather than trying to join the ‘real’ negotiation of the specific rules at an equal footing with the North.¹⁵

Take the reformation of anti-dumping (“AD”) rules for example. The AD rules were originally stipulated under Article VI of the GATT 1947, with its core content decided by developed countries. Its wording would somewhat ambiguously reflect protectionism, which could be interpreted as blocking

developing countries from entering markets of developed countries. The Kennedy Round offered an opportunity to reform such rules. Although more developing countries had participated in this round, only a few of them had joined the negotiation on AD rules. The key players for reforming the AD rules still remain to be members of the OECD. The only proposal of developing countries was related to comparable pricing. Even this was, however, not adopted for strong opposition from developed countries.¹⁶ There was no effective SSC on this issue. There were two reasons on this failure. First, a majority of developing countries did not regard the AD rules as their own matter because their exports were mainly primary products which would seldom be restricted by AD rules.¹⁷ Second, the amount of the final countervailing duties was limited, even if a trade measure was eventually ruled to be dumping.¹⁸

The SSC strategy of Phase I, however, was not without some achievements. After years of united campaign, developing countries successfully reformed the GATT's clause regarding the "reciprocal, most-favored-nation, and nondiscriminatory treatment" in November 1964, June 1971, and November 1979, respectively. The non-reciprocal Generalized System of Preferences targeting products exported from developing countries was gradually approved and confirmed.¹⁹ The SDT has been developed as a principle which has been finally incorporated in many specific GATT/WTO rules, so that developing countries could rely on it in future negotiations.²⁰

3. Phase II (1986 - 1999): SSC under Neo-liberalism

From the 1980s, developed countries gradually shifted their industrial bases from traditional manufacturing to services and intellectual properties. Following such trend, the GATT's trade rules had to cover these new issues inevitably.

Meanwhile, economic depression throughout this period forced developing countries to adopt export-oriented economic policies, so as to contain their increasing domestic deficits by enlarging transboundary trade. The more developing countries accessed to the world market, the more they were dependent on the overlaying international trade environment and its accompanying rules. Against this backdrop, western neo-liberalism began to replace the dependency

theory²¹ to become the ideological ground for these developing countries to determine their domestic economic policies. Politically, because of the Cold War, developing countries gradually lost their strategic room as a third party between the US and the Soviet Union.²²

For this period, the main concern of the South shifted from the “fairness of the outcome” to the “fairness of the process.”²³ They hoped to be involved in the free trade system, rather than being offered only some specific preferential treatments. In the course of trade liberalization, many developing countries believed that a level playing field and an atmosphere of fair competition in the world market would be helpful for their domestic economy. They even adopted a radical negotiating tactic such as interest exchange among different economic departments by agreeing on the GATS and the TRIPS for the purpose of trading agriculture reform.²⁴

Both the North and the South might be motivated by wider multilateral trade cooperation and institution, which was later reflected through the Uruguay Round negotiations. From an *ex post* point of view, the North could successfully expand trade issues in the Uruguay Round.²⁵ Due to little interest of the South in the SSC strategy and the overwhelming influence of neo-liberalism, the North dominated the negotiations. In Phase II, the struggle for establishing NIEO was declining,²⁶ as new multilateral trade rules were not adopted for developing countries. By abandoning traditional SSC strategy and trying out the neo-liberal approach, the South was actually undertaking a “trial and error” experiment. Developing countries, however, realized its critical error when the results of Uruguay Round did not go as they had expected. On the one hand, the outcome of the so-called ‘execution issues’²⁷ became obscure; on the other, the EU, the US and Japan wanted to engage in further negotiations on a number of new sensitive issues such as competition policy, investment measures, labor standards, and transparency of government procurement.²⁸

In contrast, developing countries once again got to know the importance of the SSC in the South–North Dialogue and the amendment of relevant international law. They finally integrated their own powers to conclude the Agreement to Establish the South Centre in 1994.²⁹ The South Centre was thereby created *by* the South *for* the South in order to strengthen the unity of Southern countries and garner additional support for the study on the various questions that developing countries are confronted with. [Emphasis added]

According to the South Centre, the macroeconomic working of the global society and relevant international law-making process were subject to economic powers such as the G7, so that no single developing country could change the *status quo* on its own.³⁰ The South should thus take joint actions to win an equitable, justified, and reasonable outcome.

In toto, developing countries should defend their own common interest, adapt themselves to changing circumstances through delicate research and scientific design, harmonize various interests, and reinforce common understanding and internal cohesion.³¹

4. Phase III (2000 – present): Towards a More Pragmatic SSC

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the North has comprehensively amended its strategy for both commitments and compromise,³² based on a divide-and-conquer tactic.³³ The Doha round of multilateral negotiation was launched under the WTO regime under these circumstances. It is thus identified as a ‘development round.’³⁴

The South finally built numerous platforms after the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003 to coordinate its members’ stances in multiple fields, such as the G20 focusing on agriculture, the ‘core group’ focusing on resisting Singapore Issues, the G90 focusing on SDT and Non-Agriculture Market Access problems.³⁵ Most of these institutions are issue-specific, showing their capability of tolerating stress from outside the group (notably from the North).³⁶ This illustrates that the negotiating strategy of developing countries has evolved over time, from the original ideological group to an issue-specific and more pragmatic approach.

In the negotiating process on agriculture issues, *e.g.*, the G20, headed by India and Brazil, has been pitted against the EU and the US to form a ‘trilateral mode.’ As these main negotiating parties have diversified goals that contradict with one another, this trilateral mode is turning out to be a ‘triangular deadlock.’ More specifically, the US wants the EU and Japan to cut tariffs for agriculture and the developing countries to open their non-agriculture markets, while refusing to decrease domestic subsidies for agriculture. The EU wants developing countries to open their non-agriculture markets, while refusing to decrease its tariffs on

agriculture and its domestic subsidy for agriculture. The G20 wants the US and the EU to dramatically cut their domestic subsidies for agriculture, while refusing to open their non-agriculture markets.³⁷ Nevertheless, the very existence of this ‘triangular deadlock’ has allowed developing countries to organize a collective power for an equal position in negotiation.

Another notable change of current phase is that the South and the North have gradually hit the power balance. Some of the large developing countries (such as the BRICS countries) have become influential in both economic and political terms. They are now strong enough to take leading roles in the SSC rule-reforming process. An initial concern here is whether these emerging nations could become a separate pole in the world because some of their interests are no longer aligned with the ‘third world.’³⁸ Another concern is whether the North would take advantage of such identity confusion of these emerging nations – neither developing countries nor equal counterparts – to deny both SDT and equal treatment.³⁹ It is thus suggested that emerging nations should opt for new negotiating strategies out of the traditional SSC. If this were to be, the South would fall apart. Where should the emerging nations choose to go at this intersection? By turning to the real case of China in the following section, this paper tries to offer some comments on this problem.

5. China’s Participation and Contribution in the SSC⁴⁰

China was not an active player for a long period in the GATT/WTO regime. She only asked for restoring her identity as the GATT Contracting Party in 1986, which transformed later into an application for the WTO membership. China mainly negotiated with the GATT Contracting Parties/WTO Member States the conditions to join the system.

As the Doha Round launched just two months after China’s accession to the WTO, China had little strategic room for this round of trade negotiation. Naturally, a few key members like India, Brazil and South Africa have been the leading developing countries in the Doha Round.⁴¹

This does not mean, however, that China has no clear stance toward the SSC strategy. Since 1949, Chinese leaders have established long-term foreign

policy doctrines such as Theory of Three Worlds by Chairman MAO; the Five Principles of Peace and Co-existence by Premier ZHOU; the 28-word Foreign Policy by Xiaoping Deng; and the One Belt One Road Initiatives, and the notion of “community of shared destiny” recently proposed by President XI.⁴² These doctrines have been and will be accommodative of the allies from the friendly international weak group. In other words, China’s foreign policy is not driven solely by her own national interests, but has always been in trying to promote common values such as global justice, sovereign equality, international fairness and co-prosperity.

Despite such coherent and clear-cut national principles, China’s actual foreign policy is often complex. China, *e.g.*, would devote herself more to core interest questions such as the AD Measure, as she has been the most frequently attacked by this measure.⁴³ Recently, China has taken on an active role by building two SSC-type international financial regimes – the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These achievements are promising; according to the SSC experience in Phase I (i.e. UNCTAD against GATT 1947), a competitive institution could help the South obtain its goals, because such competition would bring certain extra pressures to the original regime to break loose its monopoly. Using tactics of “To fight but keep it from escalating (斗而不破)” may be very practical in fulfilling the SSC’s objectives.⁴⁴

6. Conclusion

Adopting the SSC strategy under the GATT/WTO system has never been easy. However, it is an undeniable process. In the beginning, the South simply got together under the common ideology referred to as the “value-rational actions.”⁴⁵ It aimed to change the then existing institution or order. In that phase, the South just followed instrumental rationality as it integrated into the neo-liberal economic order as against its original plan of reformation⁴⁶; they tried to pragmatically maximize their own benefits by acknowledging and taking advantage of the existing international economic order and rules, which turned out to be a failure.⁴⁷

The SSC strategy could be tailored according to each specific issue. One of these approaches is the ‘organizational implementation’ which could identify

the G77 as a bloc-type coalition, while the G20, as an issue-based (agriculture) coalition.⁴⁸ The South recently invokes the issue-based coalition more frequently as a SSC strategy.

China's performance in the GATT/WTO rule-making and rule-reforming process has been largely restricted as a new comer. However, her clear-cut stance on the SSC has been often proven in and out of the institutions. As her national power and global influence are growing, China will be making more contributions to the SSC in both theory and practice.

Appendix

Table 1: Multilateral Trade Negotiations under GATT/WTO⁴⁹

Name	Start	Subjects covered	Achievements
Geneva	1947	Tariffs	Signing of GATT, 45,000 tariff concessions affecting \$10 billion of trade
Annecy	1949	Tariffs	Some 5,000 tariff concessions exchanged
Torquay	1950	Tariffs	Some 8,700 tariff concessions exchanged, 1948 tariff levels cut by 25%
Geneva II	1956	Tariffs, admission of Japan	\$2.5 billion in tariff reductions
Dillon	1960	Tariffs	Tariff concessions worth \$4.9 billion
Kennedy	1964	Tariffs, Anti-dumping	Tariff concessions worth \$40 billion
Tokyo	1973	Tariffs, non-tariff measures, "framework" agreements	Tariff reductions worth more than \$300 billion
Uruguay	1986	Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO, etc.	Creation of WTO, wider range of trade negotiations (to intellectual property rights), major reductions in tariffs (about 40%) and agricultural subsidies, an agreement to allow full access for textiles and clothing from developing countries.
Doha	2001	Tariffs, non-tariff measures, agriculture, labor standards, environment, competition, investment, transparency, patents etc.	Bali Package signed on the 7th December 2013. The round has not yet concluded.

Table 2: Phases of SSC Rule-making and Rule-reforming under GATT/WTO

	Phase I (1947-1986)	Phase II (1986-1999)	Phase III (2000-2015)
International Background	Continuous Cold War, Demand for NIEO, 1970s' Economic Crisis	End of Cold War, Shift to Outward-orientated Economy, Prevalence of Neo-liberalism over the Globe,	1990s' Asian Financial Crisis, Rise of Emerging Economies, South-North Gap narrowed, Global Financial Crisis
Core Pursuit	Fairness of Outcome	Opportunity to Participate	Sophisticated Goals
Main Platforms	UNCTAD, G77	South Center	Core Group, G20 (Agricultural Group), G99
Negotiating Tactic	Rigid and Ideological, Direct Demand for Fairness of the Outcome	Full Acceptance of Neo-liberalism	Issue-Specific, Sagacious Bargain
Representative Results	Special & Differential Treatment, General System of Preferences	Inter-Sector Exchange of Interests	Ongoing Stalemate

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1. Along with the enactment of the international economic rules, the international economic disputes settlement would constitute altogether the so-called "international legal process." Through the interpretation and application of international economic rules by an arbiter with adequate legitimacy, these rules could be also evolving. See K. Abbott & D. Snidal, *Value and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption*, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141-78 (2002). In the GATT/WTO, the South-South Coalition can be adopted as a strategy in the enactment and reformation of the international economic rules, when weak nations could align with one another in order to defend collectively their common interests. It is, however, unlikely to appear during a dispute settlement process, because such definition is rather legal or juridical rather than political. Also, in the former sense, this research would retrospect the South-South Coalition strategy.
2. The US and Europe were divergent on the fundamental aims and the meaning of 'fairness' of ITO. The US had an urgent need to occupy the world market as its political and economic power were both irrefutably superior in the postwar era, so that her main concern with regard

- to a multilateral trade system would be on the “fairness of the process,” leading to a free cross-border trade. On the contrary, most traditional European powers had been weakened through World War II, and their core concern with regard to a multilateral trade system would be on the “fairness of the outcome,” which would be more helpful for them to reconstruct their national economies. *See* A. Narlikar, *Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO*, *WORLD ECONOMY* 1012-3 (2006).
3. In the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for ITO in London in October 1946, a proposed charter was discussed and representatives of developing countries strongly advocated for the inclusion in the charter deep concern on the development interests of these countries, which later led to the inclusion of a goal to realize the economic growth. *See Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment*, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33, (1946), available at https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92290038.pdf (last visited on Feb. 18, 2016).
 4. For a concise introduction on the process and characteristics of the negotiation and enactment of GATT/WTO rules, *see* A. NARLIKAR, *THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION* 15-19 & 44-58 (2007).
 5. An Chen & Fan Yang, *Global South at 50 and Beyond? The Voice from China for Establishing NIEO*, 8 *J. EAST ASIA & INT’L L.* 80 (n. 16) (2015).
 6. *Id.* at 77 (n. 5-6).
 7. AN CHEN, *THE VOICE FROM CHINA: AN CHEN ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW* 242-5 (2014).
 8. Such classification of three phases has been adopted by other researchers, as well. *See, e.g., supra* note 2, at 1005-29. *See also* S. Page, *Developing Countries in GATT/WTO Negotiations* (Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper, 2002), available at <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4738.pdf> (last visited on Feb. 9, 2016).
 9. Page, *id.* at 12.
 10. *Supra* note 2.
 11. A. McDonald, *Organization and Management of a Complex, International, Economic Negotiation. Tokyo Round: Multilateral Trade Negotiations*, 23 *WORLD ECONOMY* 207 (2000).
 12. A. Krueger, *The Developing Countries and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations*, 22 *WORLD ECONOMY* 909 (1999).
 13. Such negotiating pattern is legitimate because the MFN and the Reciprocal Principle would ensure smaller suppliers to gain maximum benefits from any promise in-between major suppliers. *See* B. HOEKMAN & M. KOSTECKI, *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO* 131-84 (2009).
 14. Brazil and India are two exceptions. They are both the founding Contracting Parties of the GATT, and main participants to the Green Room Meetings.
 15. Page, *supra* note 8, at 13.
 16. Gang Deng, *Developing Countries and AD Rules in GATT/WTO* 邓纲: 发展中国家与 GATT/

- WTO 反倾销立法 22 MODERN LEGAL SCI. 现代法学 134 (2000).
17. Of the 134 AD cases in the period between 1972 and 1977, only two concerned agricultural products.
 18. *Supra* note 16.
 19. *Supra* note 5, at 75-105.
 20. See Committee on Trade and Development of the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions of 14 June 2013, WT/COMTD/W/196, available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=117334,73586,73871,59765,49067,21868,43008,75336,69267,64560&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextSearch= (last visited on Feb. 9, 2016).
 21. ‘Dependency theory’ means that capital resources would flow from a ‘periphery’ of poor and underdeveloped states to a ‘core’ of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. One of the core contentions of dependency theory is that poor states are impoverished, while rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the ‘world system.’ See ZHENGYI WANG & GUIYAN ZHANG, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 国际政治经济学 242-72 (2003). See also V. Ferraro, *Dependency Theory: An Introduction*, in THE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS READER 58-64 (G. Secondi ed. 2008), available at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm> (last visited on Feb. 9, 2016).
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 24. *Supra* note 2, at 1018.
 25. It is undeniable that developing countries had also won some achievements. *E.g.*, such new protocols and rules to the Agreements on Textiles and Clothing, Anti-dumping, and Agriculture were advantageous to them. For details, see Haicong Zuo, *Treatments to Developing Countries under GATT/WTO Regime: Rules and Implementation* GATT/WTO 体制中发展中国家的待遇: 规则与实施, 2 ESSAYS ON ECON. L. 经济法论丛 146-9 (2001). Introducing a new set of dispute settlement process into the WTO framework would be a good policy to the South. See J. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135-45 (2006).
 26. *Supra* note 23, at 33-55.
 27. This term refers to the special commitments that the North made during the Uruguay Round but could not fulfill later on, and the unexpected costs for developing countries to carry out their promises.
 28. *Supra* note 2, at 1023.
 29. South Center, *Agreement to Establish the South Center* (1994), available at <http://www>.

- southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Intergovernmental-Agreement_EN.pdf (last visited on Jan. 26, 2016).
30. See THIRTY YEARS OF THE GROUP OF 77 (1964–1994), UNITED FOR A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE, South Centre publications, Geneva. 13-6 (1994).
 31. *Id.*
 32. *E.g.*, the North was committed to more transparency on the rule of procedures after the Seattle Ministerial Meeting. See A. Narlikar, *Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO*, in 29 WORLD ECONOMY 1022 (2006).
 33. During the preparation stage for the 2001 Doha Ministerial Meeting, developed countries have adopted multiple times the so-called “Carrot and Stick” policy in order to break loose the coordination of the developing countries. See A. Kwa, *WTO and Developing Countries*, (Nov. 1, 1998), 4 FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, available at http://fpif.org/wto_and_developing_countries (last visited on Jan. 28, 2016).
 34. In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, “Least Developed Countries” have been mentioned 29 times, while “Developing Countries” 24, and “Less Developed Countries” 19. See A. Panagariya, *Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis*, 25 WORLD ECONOMY 1223-4 (2002).
 35. *Supra* note 2, at 1025.
 36. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the proliferation of these coordinating groups have added difficulty of reaching any final compromise. See *supra* note 4, at 112-3 (2007).
 37. Feng Ji, *Retrospect on Agricultural Negotiation of Doha Round and Its Characteristics* 季风: 多哈回合农业谈判的回顾及特点分析, 9 TRENDS AND STUDIES ON WTO世纪贸易组织动态与研究 17-22 (2007).
 38. India is an example frequently cited, as it refused to sign on the Agreement on Trade Facilitation by July 2014 which made the Bali Package an eventual failure.
 39. *Supra* note 22, at 186-204.
 40. This paper mainly focuses on the rule-making and rule-reforming process under the GATT/WTO. China has been a relatively active player in the WTO dispute settlement process since its accession. With regard to China’s performance of the SSC strategy under the GATT/WTO regime, current researches mainly deals with the legitimacy of Special & Differential Treatments, and the advocacy for a NIEO. See, *e.g.*, *supra* note 7; *supra* note 22 at 189-90; and *supra* note 23, at 33-55.
 41. D. Chakraborty, P. Banerjee & D. Sengupta, *Developing Country Coalitions in WTO Negotiations: How cohesive would IBSAC (India, Brazil, South Africa, China) be?* (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Working Paper W.P. No. EC-12-12, 2012), available at <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ift/wpaper/1212.html> (last visited on Feb. 9, 2016).
 42. *Supra* note 5, at 75-105.
 43. Official statistics of the WTO (Jan 1, 1995 to June 30, 2014) shows that China’s exporting merchandise were filed a total of 1022 AD investigation (with Korea ranked No. 2 with a

total of 341 and Chinese Taipei No. 3 a total of 258), 740 out of which were implemented AD measures (with Korea ranked No. 2 with a total of 207 and Chinese Taipei No. 3 a total of 166). It takes up to 22.09% of all AD investigations filed against all WTO members and 24.95% of all AD measures that were implemented during this same period. Such contrast would be more astonishing if considering that China has been a WTO member just since the end of 2001. See WTO Statistics available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm#statistics (last visited on Jan. 28, 2016).

44. “To fight but keep it from escalating” is, in its essence, ‘dialectic philosophy.’ Such kind of philosophy has been repeatedly adopted by the early generations of Chinese leaders in, e.g., China’s self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam during February 17 to March 16, 1979, and China’s self-defensive counterattack against India during June to November, 1962, and China’s War to Resist the US Aggression and to Aid Korea during 1950 to 1953. In these relatively severe conflicts, China had been rather determined in fighting for the righteous course, while at the same time rather conservative once it had occupied an overwhelming position.
45. “Value-rational action” is socially taken because of the intrinsic value itself, regardless of its consequences. It is one of Max Weber’s four action types. See T. Parsons, *Introduction*, in *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION* (A. Henderson & T. Parsons trans., 1947).
46. ‘Instrumental rationality’ is often seen as a specific form of rationality focusing on the most efficient or cost-effective means to achieve a specific end. It is, however, not in itself reflecting on the value of that end. See *Instrumental Rationality*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013 ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/rationality-instrumental> (last visited on Feb. 16, 2016).
47. *Supra* note 23, at 35.
48. A. Narlikar & D. Tussie, *The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO*, 27 *WORLD ECONOMY* 947-66 (2004).
49. See *The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh*, available at https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited on Feb. 18, 2016).